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MORAL HAZARD IN THE OIL PATCH: THE EFFECT OF THE BANKING CRISIS ON RTC HOTEL APPRAISALS IN THE AMERICAN
SOUTHWEST
Michael C. Dalbor
ABSTRACT

This paper compares appraised hotel values of Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC) properties in the American Southwest ("Oil Patch" states) with their respective market values. The RTC was given the task of having hotel properties
appraised and subsequently auctioned for sale. However, RTC officialswere aware
they had limited time and funding for their operations. Consequently, RTC officials
faced a significant amount of political pressure to sell non-performing assets
quickly, particularly in the Oil Patch where banking problems were especially
severe. Given these circumstances, the RTC may have been motivated to influence
appraised hotel values downward to sell more assets faster. The results of this paper
indicate appraised hotel values to be lower than their market values in the region.
Moreover, the differences between appraised values and market values were significantly more negative in the Oil Patch than in other regions.

Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to compare appraised hotel values completed for the
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) with hotel market values in the American Southwest
during the period of RTC operations (1989-1995). Given the overwhelming task for the
RTC of resolving the nation's savings and loan crisis and the limited amount of funding
given for this task, the RTC needed to sell assets rapidly. This may have led the RTC to
encourage appraisers to push hotel values downward in an effort to accept lower bids
and remove non-performing assets from the books. This paper provides evidence that
appraised hotel values were significantly lower than market values in the southwestern
states, and that these differences were significantly greater than those in other regions of
the United States. The results support the notion that relationships in the process and the
motivations of the parties affect appraised values.

Background
The banking crisis of the 1980s was particularly severe in the southwestern United
States. More than half of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's resolution costs
from 1986 to 1994 were generated by bank failures in the "Oil Patch" states of Arkansas,
Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. Furthermore, over 70 percent of United
States bank failures between 1987 and 1989 occurred in the Southwest. The state with the
most problems was Texas, which accounted for nearly 30 percent of RTC resolution costs
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The initial problem of the 1980s for savings and loan institutions became the steep
increase in interest rates in 1980 and 1981. Rates on deposits subsequently began to
exceed the rates on existing home mortgage loans held by these institutions. In an
attempt to help the thrift industry the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 phased out interest rate controls and allowed thrifts to earn
higher returns by lending for commercial real estate projects.
However, this action was taken too late to effectively help the thrifts. In response, the
Garn-St. Germain Act was passed in 1982 to help the industry become solvent. As discussed by Dotsey and Kuprianov (1990), the major feature of the act was to forestall government intervention via institution closure, which led to further accumulated losses for
deposit insurance funds.
A policy of non-government intervention, called regulatory forbearance, was strictly
adhered to in the American Southwest. Research by Cole (1993) found that thrift institutions in that region were significantly more likely to be insolvent, but had a much lower
probability of closure than did thrifts in other regions. Cole attributes this fact to political
pressure to keep thrifts open in the Southwest and to the insufficient regulatory staff in
the region that was overwhelmed by the magnitude of the problem.
The lack of non-risk-based deposit insurance before 1992 also provided an incentive
for moral hazard by bank officers. As shown by Gilbert (1990), deposit insurance created
an investment atmosphere that allowed banks to assume greater risks than they normally
would have without the insurance. Thus, bankers had the incentive to "grow out of their
problems" by engaging in risky lending activities such as increased commercial real
estate lending.
Additionally, thrift officials took excessive risks because of the lack of equity capital.
As shown by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the less management equity in the firm, the
greater the incentive for managers to consume perquisites. Banks have historically maintained some of the lowest amounts of equity capitalization. Furthermore, Park (1994)
shows that the lack of equity capital encouraged banks to engage in risky behavior
because owners can reap any positive benefits while losses will be borne primarily by
debt holders.
The moral hazard problems at lending institutions spilled over into the appraisal
industry. As problems in the banking industry began to increase, the appraisal process
and the industry itself fell under increased scrutiny. The U.S. House Committee on Government Operations (1986) held hearings in 1985 on appraisal practices and concluded
that the lack of appraiser certification and the practice of "client advocacy appraising"
contributed to the savings and loan crisis. Moreover, according to federal regulators in
the southwestern U.S., "many appraisals were apparently out of touch with reality and
... inflated appraisals were easy to ~ b t a i n . "Thus,
~
for perhaps the first time, relationships in the appraisal process were considered to have a significant impact on appraisal
results.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, History of the Eighties: Lessonsfor the Future, 1997, p.
304.
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Sample / alternative hypothesis
Oil Patch / mean difference less than 0
Non-Oil Patch / mean difference equal to 0
Oil Patch / non-Oil Patch mean differences equal

T Statistic
- 1.42
1.61
2.11

P Value
.08
.11
.04

Table 3
Non-parametric test results
Panel A - Wilcoxon test of medians

W
Statistic
Sample/ alternative hypothesis
260.5
Oil Patch / median difference less than 0
1951.0
Non-Oil Patch / median difference equal to 0
5456.0
Oil Patch / non-Oil Patch median differences unequal
Panel B - Kruskal-Wallis test of medians

P Value
.05
.35
.03

H
Sample/ alternative hypothesis
Oil Patch / non-Oil Patch median differences equal
Panel C- Mood's median test
Sample/ alternative hypothesis
Oil Patch / non-Oil Patch median differences equal

Statistic
5.82

P Value
.02

Chi-Square
Statistic
5.24

P Value
.02

The median difference is calculated as the appraised value minus the sales price, divided by the sales
price. For hotel appraisals in the Oil Patch, the expectation is for the median difference to be less than
zero. Furthermore, hotel appraisals in the Oil Patch are expected to have greater negative differences
than appraisals in other regions.

Panel A of Table 3 repeats the three tests used in Table 2 by using the Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank Sum test. The results of this test largely confirm those found using the t distribution. The most important test is to examine the differences between the two subsamples. Accordingly, the Kruskal-Wallis method and Mood's Median Test were also used to
further assess the reliability of the Wilcoxon results. Both tests support the results previously obtained. Furthermore, the Mood's Median Test is highly robust against outliers
and both Kruskal-Wallis and Mood's Median tests are considered non-parametric alternatives to an ANOVA model.
Nevertheless, the ANOVA model for this analysis is %DIFF= y.. + a1 OILPATCH+Ei.
The single explanatory variable used is OILPATCH, an indicator variable for those
appraisals completed for hotels located in Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
and Texas. ERROR is the error term in the model. The results of the analysis are shown in

